Neurocognitive Synthesis of Cognition, Belief, Value, Attitude, and Ideology: An Integrated Understanding of Social Constructs
Neurocognitive Synthesis of Cognition, Belief, Value, Attitude, and Ideology: An Integrated Understanding of Social Constructs
I. Introduction: A Neurocognitive Synthesis of Social Constructs
1.1. Stating the Interdisciplinary Challenge
To develop a deep understanding (Samajh) of the functional relationships between Attitude, Value, Belief, Cognition, and Ideology requires moving beyond traditional social psychology to incorporate mechanistic computational and neuroscientific explanations. These concepts represent a hierarchy, spanning from transient physical substrates (Cognition) to wide-ranging social structures (Ideology).1
1.2. The Proposed Integrated Framework (Samajh)
This report presents a robust understanding that integrates Dual Process Models (DPM) 3 to describe operational modes (automatic vs. controlled) with the Predictive Processing Framework (PPF) 4 to explain the underlying computational architecture (belief updating via error minimization). This synergy provides explanations for both ideological stability and attitude variability. PPF, which fundamentally posits that the brain is constantly updating a "mental model" of the environment, highlights how belief formation and maintenance are fundamentally an active drive toward cognitive efficiency.5
1.3. Hierarchical Mapping: From Neuron to Ideology
This framework establishes a nested hierarchy. Cognition comprises the foundational processes 6; Beliefs are computational contents subjectively held to be true about the world, corresponding to high-level expectations or 'priors' within the PPF.4 Attitudes are object-specific evaluations, functioning as cognitive schemata.6 Values are higher-level goals that guide these evaluations.6 Finally, Ideology is the coherent, shared system that maximizes collective prediction and cooperation.4 Ideology is thus the highest expression of structured collective beliefs arising from core cognitive processes.
II. Establishing the Psychosocial Hierarchy: Definitions and Structural Roles
2.1. Cognition and Belief: The Foundational Units
Cognition encompasses all mental processes, including attention, reasoning, and perception.6 It is the neurobiological engine upon which all other constructs operate. Beliefs are propositions about the world that are subjectively held to be true.6 From a computational perspective, beliefs directly correspond to high-level 'priors' or expectations within the PPF.4
PPF reframes belief not as passive storage, but as an active prediction.4 The profound implication of this is that the brain is inherently goal-oriented—focused on minimizing prediction error.5 Therefore, the maintenance of a belief (or ideological commitment) is fundamentally a drive toward cognitive efficiency, not just holding an opinion. In this perspective, belief formation is continual "learning on the job," where changes in perception (a lower-level hypothesis) are intrinsically linked to changes in belief (a higher-level hypothesis).7
2.2. Attitude: The Evaluative Summary (The ABC Model)
In psychology, an Attitude is a summary evaluation of an object, composed of three components: Cognition (beliefs), Affect (emotional responses), and Behavioral Tendencies (intentions/motivations).6 This tripartite structure is known as the ABC Model.
Attitudes function as cognitive schemata, providing a structure to organize complex or ambiguous information, guiding specific evaluations and behaviors.6 They influence behavior at the individual, interpersonal, and societal levels.6 While traditionally considered persistent, contemporary conceptualizations show that attitudes may vary depending on context, situation, or mood, highlighting the influence of motivational and situational factors.6
2.3. Value: The High-Level Moral Substrate
Values are more abstract and context-transcendent than attitudes. They are higher-level goals that serve expressive or symbolic functions, affirming one's psychological needs and maintaining social identity.6
The Value-Belief-Norm (VBN) Theory explicitly links values to beliefs and behavior.9 According to this model, individuals who accept a movement's core values (e.g., environmental preservation) form the belief that those valued objects are threatened, generating a personal norm (obligation) for action.10
Values, when coupled with Expectancies in Social Cognitive Theory (SCT), determine the desirability attached to the outcomes of a belief.11 Ideology reinforces the entire system by employing these core values (e.g., tradition, openness to change).9 In an established ideological framework, a threat to an ideology is registered as a threat to a person's fundamental values, triggering powerful defense mechanisms.12
2.4. Ideology: The Systemic Coherence Mechanism
Ideology is a structured, comprehensive system of shared beliefs and values that interprets and dictates social and political reality.4 It operates at the societal level.6
Psychology has historically focused on the content of ideological beliefs (e.g., political conservatism). However, a modern approach calls for focusing on the structure of ideological thinking, examining the common mechanisms diverse ideologies use to mobilize their followers.13
According to PPF, ideology functions as a shared prediction error minimization strategy. Group members adopt shared ideologies and beliefs to predict the behavior of others and cooperate on a large scale.4 This systematic sharing of beliefs allows for the regulation of thinking within the group.
Table I: Hierarchical Relationship of Core Psychosocial Constructs
Construct | Computational Role (PPF) | Psychological Locus | Primary Function | Relation to Ideology |
Cognition | Substrate/Processing Mechanism | Neural Networks, Attention, Working Memory | Information processing, perception, reasoning | Provides fundamental computational capacity. |
Belief | High-Level 'Prior' Expectations | Explicit/Implicit Representations | Subjective representation of reality (truth claim) | Primary units organized and structured by ideological frameworks. |
Attitude | Object-Specific Summary Evaluation | Cognitive Schemata, Reflective/Impulsive Systems | To guide specific evaluations and behaviors (ABC) | Specific application of ideological tenets onto a target object. |
Value | Outcome Desirability/High-Level Goals | Moral Substrate, Expectancies 11 | To affirm identity, provide justification and moral norms | Normative engine; provides the core moral 'ought' of the ideological system. |
Ideology | Shared Predictive Model | Systematic, High-Level Cognitive Structure | To maximize collective prediction, cooperation, and social identity 4 | The overarching structure that determines stability and coherence among all lower elements. |
III. The Foundational Cognitive Architecture: Dual Process Models (DPM) and Control
3.1. System 1 vs. System 2: Modes of Operation
Dual process theories explain that thought can arise in two distinct ways.
Implicit (System 1): This is automatic, unconscious, associative, and fast. Decisions are based on temporal and spatial proximity.3 This system is responsible for the rapid formation of stereotyped, emotional impressions about candidates or social situations .
Explicit (System 2): This is controlled, conscious, and based on symbolic representation and propositional reasoning. It is used to guide decision-making processes based on knowledge, values, and goals.3
Crucially, both systems operate in parallel and interact with each other.3 Ideological influences are strong because System 1 (automatic bias) is constantly shaping perception, and System 2 (reflective thought) must actively suppress it. Explicit processes or attitudes can be changed with education and persuasion, but implicit processes or attitudes usually take a long time to change with the forming of new habits.3
3.2. Cognitive Control, Working Memory, and Attitude Modulation
Working Memory Capacity (WMC) is inextricably linked to attention and serves as a central executive for attention control.16 Individuals lower in WMC are particularly susceptible to biases because WMC modulates the active suppression or inhibition of "automatic" (System 1) processing.17
Since WMC is a limited resource 18, ideological persuasion and maintenance are sensitive to cognitive load. If cognitive resources are depleted, the default, automatic processing (System 1), which is deeply biased by established ideological 'priors,' dominates.15 This implies that controlled change (System 2) requires effort. Ideology resists change because processing counter-evidence requires high WMC, making the automatic, affective rejection of contradictory evidence (System 1) the path of least resistance.
3.3. Attitude Change and Cognitive Dissonance
People strive for internal consistency, and Cognitive Dissonance (the discomfort arising from holding conflicting beliefs/attitudes/behaviors) is a key mechanism for change.5 To reduce dissonance, an individual must either change the attitude or change their actions to be more congruent with beliefs.5
The effectiveness of persuasion depends on the recipient's motivation and ability to process information (System 2 engagement).17 Changes that are not consciously related to belief change (non-belief changes) can often be explained by traditional expectancy-value models.19 This highlights how values (the ascribed worth of a belief) drive the change process.
IV. Predictive Processing Framework (PPF) as a Unified Computational Theory
4.1. Core Principle: Prediction Error Minimization
The PPF posits that the brain constantly generates and updates a "mental model" (priors/beliefs) used to predict sensory input. Perception and learning occur through the minimization of Prediction Error—the deviation between the expected signal (top-down) and the actual sensory input (bottom-up).4
This mechanism extends directly to social and ideological cognition. Ideological judgments involve social cognitive processes, where ideological beliefs act as top-down expectations that constrain incoming social and political data.4
4.2. Ideology and Shared 'Prior' Expectations
The adoption of shared ideologies is computationally understood as shared error minimization.20 By aligning their 'priors' (ideologies), group members can predict each other's behavior and act cooperatively to reduce uncertainty in a complex social environment.4 Viewing ideology not as a specific hypothesis, but as a prior is most productive—it is a background condition for how subsequent beliefs will be formed and perceived.7
4.3. Precision-Weighting: The Mechanism of Ideological Rigidity
Precision-Weighting is the mechanism by which the weight or certainty afforded to the top-down prediction ('prior'/belief) or the bottom-up evidence (sensory input/counter-evidence) is flexibly adjusted.10 This is the computational root of motivated reasoning.
Ideological rigidity occurs when established ideological 'priors' are afforded high precision (weight/confidence).10 When the 'priors' are believed to be more precise than incoming evidence, hypotheses become "stubborn" and resistant to change.10
A metacognitive bias exists where deep 'prior' expectations influence confidence more strongly than immediate perceptual decisions.8 This bias leads to a tendency to incorporate confirmatory evidence, resulting in high confidence in 'prior'-dominant perceptions, even when objective evidence suggests otherwise.8
Ideological extremism can be understood as an excessive, distorted assignment of high precision to certain 'priors.' This leads to aberrant sensations (treating conflicting reality as error), which, due to the skewing of priors, results in aberrant beliefs (e.g., conspiracy theories, extremism).4 In this way, ideology hijacks the brain's fundamental mechanism for prediction and prioritizes belief maintenance over accurate environmental registration. The belief system protects itself by computationally devaluing external reality signals.
Table II: Predictive Processing Correlates of Ideological Behavior (Motivated Reasoning)
PPF Concept | Psychological Equivalent | Ideological Manifestation | Neural Correlate (Resistance to Change) |
Prior Prediction | Deep belief or worldview (Ideology) | Core tenets, political stance, expectations | Default Mode Network (DMN) (Self-representation/disengagement from external world) 22 |
Sensory Evidence | Bottom-up data/Input Signal | Counter-evidence, contradictory expert information | Orbitofrontal Cortex (OFC) (Decreased activity suggests discounting of evidence) 24 |
Prediction Error | Discrepancy between 'prior' and evidence | Cognitive dissonance, threat to worldview coherence | Insula and Amygdala (Increased affective/salience response to conflict) 24 |
Precision-Weighting | Subjective confidence in 'prior' vs. evidence | Motivated reasoning, selective attribution of authority | Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex (DMPFC) (Increased activation relates to resistance) 24 |
Belief Updating | Error minimization/Attitude change | Ideological flexibility, acceptance of counter-evidence | Reduced Amygdala and Insula response when evaluating counter-evidence 22 |
V. Mechanisms of Ideological Resistance and Neurocognitive Maintenance
5.1. The Bidirectional Neurocognitive Model of Ideology
An emerging model suggests that ideological worldviews may be manifestations of an individual’s perceptual and cognitive systems . This includes two key claims:
- Neurocognitive Antecedents: The brain’s low-level neurocognitive dispositions influence an individual’s receptivity to ideological doctrines . For example, structural correlations in amygdala volume suggest that inherent biological differences may predispose an individual toward certain belief systems .
- Neurocognitive Consequences: Strong exposure and adherence to ideological doctrines can actively shape and reinforce perceptual and cognitive systems . This means ideological engagement causes measurable neuroplastic change, strengthening the PPF feedback loops.
5.2. Neural Correlates of Motivated Reasoning
Resistance to political counter-evidence is driven primarily by emotional and self-referential processing, rather than purely rational evaluation.22 When confronted with conflicting information, increased activation is observed in the following regions:
- Amygdala and Insula: These areas are associated with emotional salience, threat detection, and visceral response. Participants who change their minds more frequently show less BOLD signal in these areas.22 This finding suggests that ideological change requires overcoming emotional inertia beyond mere intellectual debate.
- Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex (DMPFC): Increased response here is associated with greater belief resistance.22 The DMPFC is involved in self-referential thought and maintaining one's internal narrative, suggesting that resistance is a function of self-preservation.
- Default Mode Network (DMN): Challenging political beliefs activates the DMN, a network associated with self-representation and disengagement from the external world.22
Discounting of Evidence: During belief resistance, activity decreases in the Orbitofrontal Cortex (OFC).22 The OFC is involved in error detection and adjustment (value encoding).26 Reduced OFC activity implies that the evaluative system is shutting down the incoming evidence stream, allowing the DMPFC and Amygdala to maintain the established 'priors.'
5.3. The Neural Roots of Polarization
The competition between affective (System 1) and deliberative (System 2) networks is measurable . One network (anterior part of the brain + Amygdala) facilitates rapid, emotional, stereotyped impressions and is positively correlated with the strength of implicit bias .
A competing network, involving the Lateral Prefrontal Cortex (LPFC) (the center for deliberate, fact-based processing), shows a negative correlation with the strength of political party affiliation . This implies that strong ideological allegiance (high precision in ideological priors) computationally imposes a state of controlled disengagement, actively suppressing the LPFC resources necessary for fact-based, deliberate change (System 2), ensuring the dominance of emotional, automatic responses.
VI. Integration of Subjectivity and Mechanism: Philosophical Limits
6.1. The Explanatory Gap and Ideological Conviction
While the PPF/DPM framework provides a mechanistic explanation (how beliefs are processed and defended), it runs into the philosophical limit known as the Explanatory Gap or the Hard Problem of Consciousness .
This gap is the difficulty physicalist philosophies have in explaining how physical properties give rise to the way things feel subjectively when they are experienced (qualia).27 We can map the neural correlates of belief , but we cannot mechanistically explain the subjective conviction or the high-level moral justification inherent in a deeply held value or ideology.29
If ideological commitment often feels like a moral imperative or a self-evident truth, the explanatory framework must acknowledge that the high-level cognitive structure (Ideology) is not just a computational convenience, but a source of subjective, lived meaning that resists simple mechanistic reduction .
6.2. Ideology as a Functional Political Resource
Ideology should not be viewed only as a "cognitive defect" (distorted 'prior').31 It serves as a vital political resource, especially for solving collective action problems.31 It provides the shared motivational structure necessary for collective action, such as for large-scale social movements or revolutions.10 It dictates the set of beliefs and norms required for a group to mobilize and cooperate.
VII. Conclusion and Future Research Directions
7.1. Synthesis of the Integrated Framework (Samajh)
The overarching understanding explaining Attitude, Value, Belief, Cognition, and Ideology is the Neurocognitive Predictive Processing Synthesis. This framework successfully maps the functional relationships:
- Cognition provides the computational mechanism (prediction error minimization).
- Beliefs are the content (priors) actively engaged in prediction.
- Attitudes are structured by these beliefs and regulated by DPM (System 1/2).
- Values afford moral weight (precision-weighting/desirability) to attitudes and beliefs.
- Ideology is the high-level, shared predictive model, structurally maintained by motivated reasoning (via DMPFC/Amygdala activation), which affords high precision to ideological priors, ensuring stability and collective coherence.4
The neurocognitive perspective demonstrates that adherence to an ideology is deeply embedded in the brain's fundamental functions. Changing an ideological mind requires not merely presenting new facts, but disrupting a carefully protected, emotionally regulated, and computationally efficient system of self-representation and social prediction.
7.2. Recommendations for Future Interdisciplinary Study
Future research should focus on refining the PPF model to more explicitly integrate the neural networks responsible for motivated affect (Amygdala, Insula) with the networks of cognitive control (LPFC, DMPFC) during active ideological engagement.22 Specifically, investigating pharmacological or computational means to flexibly modulate precision-weighting might yield new insights for combating ideological extremism and polarization.
Works cited
- A neurocognitive model of ideological thinking - Cambridge University Press & Assessment, accessed October 28, 2025, https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/38CBDADC3414FA5783AE2730FAF36ACD/S0730938421000101a.pdf/neurocognitive_model_of_ideological_thinking.pdf
- A neurocognitive model of ideological thinking | Politics and the Life Sciences | Cambridge Core, accessed October 28, 2025, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-the-life-sciences/article/neurocognitive-model-of-ideological-thinking/38CBDADC3414FA5783AE2730FAF36ACD
- Dual process theory - Wikipedia, accessed October 28, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_process_theory
- "Ideology and Predictive Processing: Coordination, Bias, and Polarizati" by Nathan E. Wheeler, Suraiya Allidina et al. - UNL Digital Commons - University of Nebraska–Lincoln, accessed October 28, 2025, https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscifacpub/129/
- Predictive coding - Wikipedia, accessed October 28, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Predictive_coding
- Attitude (psychology) - Wikipedia, accessed October 28, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attitude_(psychology)
- Predictive Processing and the Varieties of Psychological Trauma - Frontiers, accessed October 28, 2025, https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01840/full
- Attitude formation and change | Research Starters - EBSCO, accessed October 28, 2025, https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/psychology/attitude-formation-and-change
- Pro-Environmental Behaviours and Value-Belief-Norm Theory: Assessing Unobserved Heterogeneity of Two Ethnic Groups - MDPI, accessed October 28, 2025, https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/11/12/3237
- A Value-Belief-Norm Theory of Support for Social Movements: The Case of Environmentalism - Western CEDAR, accessed October 28, 2025, https://cedar.wwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=hcop_facpubs
- Social Cognitive Theory Model - Rural Health Promotion and Disease Prevention Toolkit, accessed October 28, 2025, https://www.ruralhealthinfo.org/toolkits/health-promotion/2/theories-and-models/social-cognitive
- Attitude in Psychology—Definition, Formation, and How They Change - Verywell Mind, accessed October 28, 2025, https://www.verywellmind.com/attitudes-how-they-form-change-shape-behavior-2795897
- A Psychology of Ideology: Unpacking the Psychological Structure of Ideological Thinking - PMC - PubMed Central, accessed October 28, 2025, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9274788/
- The neural binding problem(s) - PMC - PubMed Central, accessed October 28, 2025, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3538094/
- Social Cognition and Attitudes - Noba Project, accessed October 28, 2025, https://nobaproject.com/modules/social-cognition-and-attitudes
- Working memory, attention and their relationship: A theoretical overview - ResearchGate, accessed October 28, 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351585178_Working_memory_attention_and_their_relationship_A_theoretical_overview
- Individual Differences in Working Memory Capacity and Dual-Process Theories of the Mind - PMC - PubMed Central, accessed October 28, 2025, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC1351135/
- Working Memory and Attention – A Conceptual Analysis and Review - PubMed Central, accessed October 28, 2025, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6688548/
- THE NEURAL CORRELATES OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR, accessed October 28, 2025, https://neuroethics.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Ariel-White-Paper-FINAL.pdf
- Connectionism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed October 28, 2025, https://iep.utm.edu/connectionism-cognition/
- Beliefs and desires in the predictive brain - PMC - NIH, accessed October 28, 2025, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7468257/
- Neural correlates of maintaining one's political beliefs in the face of counterevidence, accessed October 28, 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311899403_Neural_correlates_of_maintaining_one's_political_beliefs_in_the_face_of_counterevidence
- A Synergistic Workspace for Human Consciousness Revealed by Integrated Information Decomposition - eLife, accessed October 28, 2025, https://elifesciences.org/reviewed-preprints/88173v3/pdf
- Are Freud and Psychoanalysis Still Relevant? - Alliant International University, accessed October 28, 2025, https://www.alliant.edu/blog/are-freud-and-psychoanalysis-still-relevant
- Political Neuroscience: Understanding How the Brain Makes Political Decisions - OSF, accessed October 28, 2025, https://osf.io/kvzcf_v1/download/
- (PDF) The neural basis of politically motivated reasoning. - ResearchGate, accessed October 28, 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/375065887_The_neural_basis_of_politically_motivated_reasoning
- Explanatory gap - Wikipedia, accessed October 28, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Explanatory_gap
- Psychodynamic psychotherapy: developing the evidence base | Advances in Psychiatric Treatment | Cambridge Core, accessed October 28, 2025, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/advances-in-psychiatric-treatment/article/psychodynamic-psychotherapy-developing-the-evidence-base/FDFB93596F9E502277720F9F4F55563A
- Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap - David Chalmers, accessed October 28, 2025, https://consc.net/papers/pceg.pdf
- Nietzsche's Moral and Political Philosophy, accessed October 28, 2025, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche-moral-political/
- The Explanatory Power of Ideology | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core, accessed October 28, 2025, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/explanatory-power-of-ideology/E4B753AFE453272389CD500AFC2ADE3C
- Why haven't we found an unified theory for consciousness? - Quora, accessed October 28, 2025, https://www.quora.com/Why-havent-we-found-an-unified-theory-for-consciousness